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Delhi is one of the most extensively studied urban areas globally. Yet, academic literature on the 
question of “informality, as a mode of governance” (Roy 2005) has seldom paid attention to the 
production of Muslim spaces in the city. Jamil (2017), in her scholarship on Muslim localities in 
Delhi, introduces a rare perspective on how the urban Muslim is spatially organized within the 
dominant ideology of urbanization in Delhi. This paper examines the history and politics of 
(un)plannability to understand the production of Muslim colonies (focusing on Jamia Nagar) in 
the context of neoliberalization in Delhi and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. The paper 
follows the changing body of the state to explain the political rationality of “exclusion” (Agamben 
2005, Ong 2006), which does not always follow the logic of neoliberal governmentality. This 
paper argues that the formation of Muslim neighbourhoods as the ‘enemy within’ is taking place 
under state powers that pursue anti-Muslim policies on one hand and neoliberal urban expansion 
on the other. I highlight the conditions of use and exchange of land that facilitate the blurring of 
boundaries between state and society in Muslim colonies. Here, I pay particular attention to the 
various ‘democratic’ processes that create informality through large-scale urban land acquisition 
and regularization of the ‘unauthorized’. This research contributes to Jamil’s (2017) work by 
highlighting how the racialized Muslim space is re-produced through its exclusion. It does so by 
integrating spatial analysis with traditional archival materials and oral histories. The 
territorialized control of Muslims and the criminalization of their spatial politics have led to the 
solidification of a new racial order within Indian cities, where financialization of land is taking 
place within a niche market, determined by the ‘Muslim value’. The spatial analysis undertaken in 
this study highlights the practices of slow violence within urban planning and questions the ways 
in which the tentacles of the criminal justice system and prison industrial complex have converged 




Foreword: Relationship of Paper to the Plan of Study 
The ‘area of concentration’ in my Plan of Study is focused on the planning practices under the 
private property regime. This includes examining the modes of land governance and 
financialization adopted by local urban bodies, motivations for regional economic development, 
and citizens’ claims and contestations in the production of urban space. Some of the learning 
objectives outlined in the Plan of Study, which I have incorporated within the Major Paper, are 
as follows: 
Learning Objective 1.1 To develop a good knowledge of land and property rights in order to 
understand their relationship and impacts on land use planning undertaken by the state. 
Learning Objective 1.2 To acquire the skills required to study the role of the state in 
regularising land markets and its partnership with private capital in capturing the value 
produced out of redeveloped land. 
Learning Objective 2.1 To study the legacies of colonialism in neo-liberal state practices to 
understand the ways in which planning plays a key role in capital (re)accumulation. 
Learning Objective 2.2 To acquire a good knowledge of the evolving role of key actors and 
institutions in urban development in order to understand the limits of democracy in a 
city/nation building project. 
Learning Objective 2.3 To observe various forms of governance at play in the management and 
use of urban spaces in order to understand the formal and informal relationships necessary to 
sustain dominant planning practices. 
Learning Objective 3.1 To situate the important role of socio-economic unrests in policy design 
to critically understand the grounded politics of identity and place. 
Learning Objective 3.2 To investigate the role of the capitalist class and their control over land 




This Major Paper with the aim of understanding the history and politics behind the production 
of Muslims spaces through their controlled exclusion from neoliberal planning practices lends 
itself as a case study to my overall Area of Concentration. As one of the largest metropolitan 
areas in the Global South, Delhi provides us a window into the changing relationships between 
state and capital in shaping the contested development processes within our cities (Learning 
Objectives 3.1 and 3.2). Delhi state’s evolution from a revenue collector, to an infrastructure 
improvement body, to a facilitator of urban amenities and finally a manager of inequalities in 
the city, is a good avenue to understand various methods of governance (Learning Objective 
2.3). Moreover, a study of the history of land consolidation on caste and religious lines in Delhi, 
reveals its embeddedness in colonial practices of planning for the purposes of making its 
population more governable (Learning Objective 2.1and 2.2). By focusing on the formation of 
Muslim colonies as the “enemy within”, the paper seeks to reveal the practices of a state which 
pursues anti-Muslim policies on one hand, and neoliberal urban expansion on the other 
(Learning Objective 1.1 and 1.2).  
The paper, therefore, lies at the intersection of urban politics and neoliberal policy-making as it 
explores the spatial politics of different classes of Muslim neighbourhoods in Jamia Nagar, 
Delhi. This spatial analysis of planning and policy-making, which goes against the conventional 
logics of capitalist development, is therefore essential to understanding the various practices of 
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Glossary of Terms 
Aabadi Deh Inhabited, non-agricultural areas within rural villages that were usually 
assigned a single Khasra (plot) number. Land records inside Aabadi Deh are 
not maintained by the Revenue department since revenue was only 
collected from agricultural plots. Houses or buildings inside an Aabadi Deh 
are usually assigned a property number. Aabadi Deh is not necessarily the 
same as older settlements in a village. 
Benami (No-
name) Land 
A parcel of land which is purchased and registered in someone else’s name, 
and for which the real owner remains unidentified. These kinds of records 
were created to escape land ceiling provisions after the Land Reforms Act, 
1954, and Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976. More recently, 
Benami transactions have become a way to buy flats assigned only for 
lower income categories. Rent or any other income in cash or kind is 
controlled by the real (officially unidentified) owner. 
Chakbandi Chakbandi is a process of consolidation and rearrangement of land parcels 
in a revenue village so that each owner has contiguous parcels of land. 
Mussavi Map A field map and register of the revenue villages indicating its boundary and 
land parcels with their respective Khasra (land parcel) numbers. Mussavi is 
the original hand drafted copy prepared for each village. 
Khasra Number Land Parcel identification number in the Mussavi Map. This number is 
expected to be unique within a revenue village, for revenue purposes. 
Later used for urban land record keeping and subdivision. 
Lal Dora Original settlement boundary of a rural village as per the revenue records. 
This boundary was usually marked in red in the revenue village map (hence 




Land Reforms Umbrella Term for tenancy reforms, including ‘land to the tiller’, land 
ceiling regulations, and zamindari abolition. Under the Delhi land Reforms 
Act of 1954, Section 33: No agricultural landowner shall have the right to 
transfer by sale or gift, where as a result of that transaction, the landowner 
is left with less than 8 acres of land in the Union Territory of Delhi. Under 
Section 81: A landowner or tenant farmer shall be liable to eviction for 
using land for any purpose other than a purpose connected to agriculture, 
horticulture, or animal husbandry. 
Patwari A village accountant or registrar of the local authority who maintains the 
ownership records and is also responsible for the collection of land taxes 





RWA is an association that represents the interests of the residents of a 
specific urban or suburban locality. Membership is typically voluntary; 
leadership is elected and subscription fee to join and continue the 
membership with the association is compulsory. RWAs are registered 
under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. RWAs are not official organs 
of government, and even unauthorized colonies, slum designated areas 
and other “unplanned” settlement types can form RWAs to represent 
citizen interests. 
Revenue Village A revenue village is a small administrative region introduced during the 
British Indian administration for the purpose of revenue collection. A 
revenue village typically has numerous Khasras (land parcels) within it, 
including the Aabadi Deh, extended Aabadi area and agricultural lands. 
State Term used throughout the paper to refer to the overarching government 
establishment of political leaders, police, judiciary, upper/mid level 






Term used to refer to the country subdivision in a federal form of 
government. In India, the state governments are the level of governments 
below the Government of India (aka Central Government).  
Unauthorized 
Colonies (UACs) 
One of the seven “unplanned” settlement types designated by the 
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD). These colonies 
could be built in contradiction of any to the following (i) Zoning Regulations 
as per the Delhi’s Master Plans (for 1962, 2001, 2021), (ii) illegally 
subdivided land as per Section 33 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 or (iii) In 
the absence of Land Use Change for the agricultural land on which the 
settlement is built. 
Regularization of  
Unauthorized 
Colonies 
In recent years, the Delhi State government has undertaken a range of 
efforts to ‘regularize’ UACs and carry them across the line to full legitimacy. 
Post-regularization an UAC can transfer land and property legally and pay 
the required stamp duty. Regularization can also mean access to more 
service provision by government and financial institutions. 
Urban Village Rural revenue villages which have been declared ‘Urban’ under Section 507 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
While growing up, every year the roads that led to our house in Jamia Nagar, Delhi would fall 
into worse and worse condition and the strong markers of a Muslim ‘ghetto’ became even 
more evident. The scale of the uneven development between Jamia Nagar and the rest of 
South-East Delhi was too stark to be ignored. Even residents of Jamia Nagar often talked of 
moving out to some of the newer residential constructions in nearby areas of Sukhdev Vihar, 
Jasola or Noida. Clearly there was something different about Muslim colonies1 that prevented 
them from developing in the same manner as the rest of Delhi. 
My understanding of the neighbourhood was further complicated after learning that the house 
belonged to our family, but not the land2 on which it stood. Over the years as conversations 
around becoming ‘legal’ grew, I never quite understood why we were ‘not legal’ to begin with? 
How this unusual arrangement of ownership was even possible? It is only now that I 
understand that all residential colonies in Jamia Nagar, while being occupied and developed 
strongly on class lines, have one thing in common - they are all “unauthorized developments3” 
in the eyes of the state. 
I was always most at ease when at home, but as I grew older there was always some underlying 
shame in disclosing my address to new people I encountered.  People who lived in other parts 
of Delhi could identify Jamia Nagar as a “Muslim colony” and attached ever intensifying social 
and politically charged stereotypes to it (Baruah 2019, also explored further in chapter 4). This 
led me to the question that undergirds my research: How do shame and belonging come to 
terms with each other, especially when the identities in question are related to neighbourhood 
and community? As I began building a relationship with the social space around me, questions 
 
1 The term “Muslim Colonies” is colloquially used to refer to various clusters of Muslim neighborhoods in Delhi. 
These include but are not restricted to Jamia Nagar in South-East Delhi; Seelampur, Welcome and other Trans-
Yamuna rehabilitation colonies in North-East Delhi; Old Delhi or Shahjahanabad; and Taj Enclave in East Delhi. 
2 No proof of permission to use land (freehold or leasehold) 
3 One of the seven “unplanned” settlement types designated by the Government of National Capital Territory of 
Delhi (GNCTD). These settlements are often either built in ‘contradiction’ to the Delhi Master Plans. Example: 
developed without land use change for previous agricultural lands or been subdivided without following the 




of power and history became the basis of all inquiries. How do households in Jamia Nagar prove 
their de facto ownership? Why do we pay property tax when we don't have clear ownership? 
Who cleans our streets when there is a Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) sign board at the 
entry of the colony that says “MCD limit ends here”? And if the “MCD limit ends here”, then why 
are we still voting in municipal elections? 
Drawing from these questions of why my neighbourhood looks and functions the way it does, 
this paper contributes to the understanding of the formation and position of Muslim colonies 
within the politics of land acquisition and regularization of the ‘unplanned’. Through the lenses 
of land ownership and use, I make connections between the roles played by various state 
planning institutions and the intermediaries between the state and society, as they navigate 
governance, investment, and development of urban lands in Delhi.  
The Delhi that I am interested in focusing on, is composed of the land revenue villages of Okhla, 
Jasola and Jogabai (present day Jamia Nagar) that were brought into the urban sphere between 
1905-1911 during the formation years of New Delhi as the new British administrative capital. I 
look at the evolution of the state - from a revenue collector, to an infrastructure improvement 
body, to a facilitator of urban amenities and finally a manager of inequalities in the city. My 
focus is on highlighting the conditions of use and exchange of land which facilitate the blurring 
of boundaries between state and society in Muslim colonies where various “democratic” 
processes are imagined, reworked, and resisted. 
However, I have paid particular attention to not contribute to the further revelation of the 
processes and forms of passive resistance undertaken individually or collectively by the 
residents of these colonies. Theorizations on processes taking place within a bounded informal 
space carry a huge risk of exposing the ways in which socially criminalized communities occupy 
places of living and livelihood in our increasingly violent cities. Also, such theorizations often 
dangerously fall into the DeSotian fetishization of self-responsibility which further enables 





Map 1: Boundary of Jamia Nagar overlayed on the previous revenue villages of Okhla, Jogabai 
and Jasola. Also highlighted in red are the old rural settlement areas – Aabadi Deh (also known 
as lal doras in land record keeping documents). Source: Spatial data compiled from village maps 
(C-DAC n.d.). 
Conceptual Framework 
Growth of residential, commercial and institutional areas within Delhi’s unauthorized colonies, 
while being direct products of Delhi’s approach to land acquisition and urban development 
since the early 1900s, is also reflective of a particular history of neoliberal policy experiments in 
the country. Brenner and Theodore (2002) and Peck (2013) describe these linkages between 
localized histories, institutional legacies and neoliberal policy frameworks as “actually existing 
neoliberalization”, which produce uneven and path-dependent urbanisms across various socio-
economic geographies. Arguing against the “dangerously productive myth” of neoliberal 
restructuring as a form of hands-off governance, Peck et al. (2009) explains how new forms of 
state intervention have been created to simultaneously dismantle collectivist and distributionist 




Kohli (2006) when discussing the industrialization processes in India, South Korea and Brazil 
during the 1980s, highlights that these highly interventionist states have undertaken economic 
growth schemes which “ruthlessly supported capitalists, repressed labour and mobilised 
economic nationalism to provide social glue” (p.1252). After getting re-elected, post the Indian 
Emergency (1975-77), Indira Gandhi abandoned previous redistributive national level policies to 
make way for pro-business, growth-oriented strategies to favour private investment (Virmani 
2004). By scrapping legislations like the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP), 
offering major tax subsidies, loosening industrial licensing controls, opening up to foreign 
collaborations in the management of public sector enterprises and discouraging labour strikes 
and activism through special legislations, the Congress government created a charged anti-
labour and “growth first” atmosphere (Kohli 2006).  
 
Fig 1: Patterns of Capital Formation in India, by sector (1970-2002). Graph showing that the 
GDP growth in 1980s was fuelled both by public, and private corporate and household (home 
based businesses) sectors. In the 1990s however, public investments declined with a growth in 




By mid 1980s the Government of India had begun to disinvest from the state-owned Public 
Sector Undertakings (PSUs) through privatization and partial transfer of ownership to private 
industrialists (Makhija 2006). Almost a decade before the liberalisation of the Indian economy 
in 1991 (see Fig 1), the Indian state had already departed from its previously centrist 
(convenient socialism) ideologies to become a right-leaning interventionist state that distinctly 
supported the consolidation of power amongst the ruling elites. 
The Washington Consensus on development during the 1980s and 1990s prescribed a market 
of free players that would take their capital to undeveloped geographies in search of higher 
returns, which would in turn promote competitiveness between regions and lead to further 
efficient allocations of resources. Rodrick and Subramanian (2004) distinguish this “pro-market” 
strategy from a “pro-business” strategy which supports and enables established players and 
geographical regions. With pro-business strategies already underway since the 1980s, the only 
major change brought through the Liberalisation, Privatization and Globalization (LPG) reforms 
of 1991 was India’s approach to foreign investment and trade. The LPG reforms also paved the 
way for regional and national chambers of commerce to form close political ties with the Indian 
bureaucracy, so much so that the 1993-94 national financial budget came to be popularly 
known as the “Tarun Das” budget - after the prominent West Bengal industrialist and then 
director of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) (Kohli 2006b, p. 1362). By the 2000s, key policy 
makers including Montek Singh Ahluwalia4 and Manmohan Singh5 were publicly endorsing 
public-private-partnerships and inviting top industrialists to be a part of the decision making 
process (ibid.). From Tarun Das to the current leadership of CII which includes CEOs of Tata, 
Kotak and Bajaj Industries, these chambers of commerce continue to play a prominent role in 
influencing policy making and spearheading pro-growth coalitions between business elites and 
state officials (Confederation of Indian Industry n.d.). These alliances between the national 
government under the current Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and prominent business elites are 
directly reflected in the change in telecom policies during the launch of Mukesh Ambani’s JIO, 
 
4 Ahluwalia served as the deputy chairman to the Planning Commission of India from 2004-2014, before which he 
was a board member of the International Monetary Fund from 2001-2004 
5 Singh was Finance Minister of India during 1991-1996 and was responsible for spearheading the liberalization 




through the restructuring and refinancing of public sector banks to prevent Anil Ambani from 
sliding into “billionaire poverty”, and through the deregulation of environmental policies in 
favour of Gautam Adani’s “green-washed” growth (see Srujana 2019 and Wadhwa 2020). The 
most prominent however has been the growth of Baba Ramdev’s spiritual empire ‘Patanjali’, 
with BJP’s Hindu nationalism. From pushing Patanjali products into all Kendriya Bhandar’s 
(national government employees cooperative) retail shelves to serving its samples in the Indian 
Parliament, BJP’s open favoritism towards business giants has been justified as - promotion of 
Swadeshi (home-grown) products (Worth 2018). 
The narrowing of the ruling alliance between the state and the capitalist class has had a twofold 
impact – firstly, it increased the concentration of businesses in certain regional growth centres, 
and secondly, it contributed to the rising discontent amongst the religious and caste majorities 
in middle and lower income classes. Mobilization for electoral gains based on sometimes 
tokenistic and often divisive ethnic and religious sensibilities has been especially evident after 
the 1980s. The Congress paty's repressive politics to compensate for lack of material upliftment 
of politically under-represented religious groups opened the space for the subsequent growth 
of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s Hindutva politics. Regional growth centres like Hyderabad, 
Bangalore and Delhi in particular, have seen increased social tensions on grounds of 
distribution of urban development incentives within their peripheral regions (see Kennedy 
2007, Mitra 2017, Pati 2019, and Dupont 2005). 
Post 1991 economic reforms, consolidation and urbanization of previously agrarian land 
became the foundational strategy to undertake the imagined development trajectory that 
Indian cities had been prescribed. I argue that large scale land acquisition by the Delhi state, 
was not just taking place in the peri-urban areas, but also being used as a tool to formally 
include unauthorized urban villages like Okhla, Jasola and Jogabai into the governable land 
regime. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 4, these urban villages have a layered and 
complex history of mixed-use residential colonies coming up on agricultural land which was 
acquired (but never taken possession of) by the Delhi state, through large scale acquisition in 




Gururani (2019), in her work on suburban Delhi, argues that in predominantly agrarian societies 
like India, “the urban question is indeed also the agrarian question” (p.3). Complex micropolitics 
of land, property and tenure offer researchers a valuable segue into understanding the 
divergent trajectories of capitalist development within various regions in Delhi. Placing colonial 
histories within post-independence consolidation of land by caste elites in Delhi (erstwhile 
Punjab Province) produces a complex picture of the political economy of land and property 
which Gururani (2019) terms as “agrarian urbanism”. 
However, there lies a reasonable amount of difficulty in identifying and studying the presence 
of “state” in these “agro-urban” areas, where local state power is so closely intertwined with 
the political power of the landed classes. In a classical interpretation of the term, the state is 
often understood to be the locus of authority which extends control over its masses through 
various practices and institutions of the government (Fuller and Bénéï 2001). Through 
documents of birth, marriage, death, citizenship, housing occupancy permissions, utilization of 
public amenities and taxation - the state organizes and validates its citizens at every stage in 
their lives. But when questions of power begin to reveal the hidden secrets and practices of 
violence by the state, the unifying and sovereign concepts of the state begin to break down 
(Tarlo 2003). 
This paper, therefor, aims to find a way to answer the question: how can we study the state? To 
begin this process, in the forthcoming chapters I trace resource flows, distributions, and 
material or symbolic transactions to understand how ‘power of the state’ is mediated through 
fixed bureaucratic structures, local institutions and agents between the state and society. This 
mediation between key players, who have benefited from land consolidation in North India 
(Punjab region in specific) of previously agricultural land into the peri-urban sphere, is traced in 
the first half of the paper.  
Chapter 2 looks at the interplay between social relations and spatial relations to understand 
how growth coalitions between the political and caste elites have become a ‘common sense’ 
approach in the process of agrarian urbanization. It also problematizes the definition of 




Chapter 3 then focuses on the particular land history of Delhi (erstwhile Punjab province) to 
trace the evolving practices of private property development by the various land governance 
and development institutions in the city. Here I use ‘zones of exception’ as a conceptual 
framework, offered by Agamben (2005) and Ong (2006), to understand the impact of the 
practices of land consolidation undertaken in the city.  
Chapter 4 delves deeper into the development history of Muslim colonies in Delhi, with a focus 
on Jamia Nagar, to understand the reproduction of space through the process of exclusion. I 
conclude by drawing connections between the exclusion of Muslim spaces from neoliberal 
development processes, and impact of criminalization of Muslim spaces in the public domain. I 
offer an emancipatory reading of the spatial politics of Muslims (especially women) in imagining 





Chapter 2: Social Relations - Spatial Relations 
This history of land consolidation and development in India is embedded in colonial practices of 
planning, which specifically aimed to make the colonized population more governable. The 
British Colonial Government, as well as the religious and caste elites in India understood how 
“access to land” was the most powerful tool to produce and maintain dominance over large 
populations (Srinivas 1986). As a punishment for its participation in the Revolt of 1857, the 
Delhi District - previously a partially autonomous state within British ruled India - was 
incorporated in 1858 within the Punjab Province directly under the British. With the inaction of 
The Punjab Alienation of Land Act in 1900, the transfer of land ownership in the Punjab 
Province was restricted to certain “agricultural tribes” only, which were represented by upper 
caste families in the region (Cassan 2010). The membership to these agricultural tribes 
restricted the rights to buy and sell land amongst other rights of uses. Cassan (ibid.) also 
accurately observes that the British, post-1858, quickly realized that “understanding India 
required understanding Caste” (p.7). The Punjab Alienation of Land Act, therefore, served the 
dual purpose of reaffirming existing caste hierarchies that were intended to further socio- 
economic disparities between social groups; and at the same time provided stability to the 
British Empire by rewarding the loyalists to the Crown.  
The development of caste hierarchy within Muslims in South Asia reveals how the spread of 
Islam in the subcontinent did not lead to the eclipsing of caste in the region, rather it accepted 
the caste society as a way to preserve authority and social prestige held by descendants of 
Arab, Turkish, Afghan and Persian heritage. Gazetteer of the Delhi District in its chapter “Tribes 
and Castes” uses the term “Chief Muhammadan Tribes” and confirms that farming land could 
only be owned by “Sheikh, Syed, Pathan and Mughals” (Punjab Government 1884, p.68-72).  
Land Reforms and Growth Coalitions in India 
Land reforms in India carried out between 1950-1970 aimed at tenure reform, land ceiling and 
distribution, and land to the tiller reforms. While the legislation and implementation of these 




consolidated existing cast-class hierarchies stemming from the British landlord-based systems 
of revenue collection and local power. Herring (1983) calls the land distribution policies in 
various Indian states a “partially completed bourgeois revolution” which has consistently 
reflected the interest of the ruling political regime and dominant castes. Thomas Metcalf in his 
study on land reform implementation in Uttar Pradesh also noted that Muslim landlords with 
smaller landholdings were particularly targeted and witnessed a substantial decline in economic 
capital as compared to the Hindu landlords (Umar 2019).  
Seasonal agricultural labourers, tenant farmers and sharecroppers have been massively 
marginalised from the land reforms due to their positioning within the caste, religious and 
regional divisions. In an analysis of land reforms undertaken in various states of India, Basu 
(1990) argues that when combined with the national liberalization policies, these regional 
reforms were pro-sectoral and aimed towards increasing agricultural assets, instead of being 
pro-poor. Metcalf (1967) in his writings on the execution of the Zamindari Abolition Act6, 1954 
in Northern India observes that these reforms could not end poverty amongst the lower castes 
which formed the bulk of the agricultural labourers and cultivators. The lower castes simply 
became tenants of the state, in place of the zamindar (landlord) class. 
Kjær (2009) in Governance and Urban Bureaucracy, points out the tension between “efficiency 
and democracy” in a system of new public management adopted by the state. Indian State’s 
focus on maximizing the utility of the built environment and economic efficiency has led to the 
gradual shift of power in the hands of the “market”. However, the peri-urban land market 
discussed in this paper does not work in isolation and is directly linked to the increase in land 
rent for the caste-based growth coalitions active in the Delhi region. The other characteristic 
sign of the “marketized” state, according to Kjær, is the use of performance indicators to design 
policies and then use them to assess the output produced by those policies. The ‘market’ here 
was used for the consolidation of power and wealth in the hands of already powerful caste and 
class elites.  
 
6 Land reform aimed at abolishing the landlord-based system of revenue collection which were set up by the 




The urban growth coalitions (Molotch 1976) in Indian cities reflect a pattern of land, labour and 
capital accumulation achieved in social formations that are founded and maintained on caste, 
religion and gender hierarchies (Kozlowski 1980 and Pandey 2013). Bichler and Nitzan (2004) in 
Dominant Capital and The New Wars, suggest that the notion of “accumulation” needs an 
empirically grounded theorization. They argue that accumulation cannot be understood only as 
a material term, but in fact is a representation of a dominant groups’ ability to financialize on its 
socio-political power and their ability to convert growth coalitions as a ‘common sense’ method 
of urban development.  
In Delhi, the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 led to the socio-political class solidification of 
the Jats and Yadavs, both dominant land-owning agricultural tribes in the region. The Jat 
political clout in the region further increased with their entry into farmers’ unions which played 
a pivotal role in championing the ‘backward’ landowning community (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996). 
Gujars, who were an agro-pastoral caste, were gradually pushed to less fertile arid and rocky 
stretches within Delhi. However, after the passing of the first Delhi Master Plan in 1962, a new 
focus on urbanization and land development did not link the exchange value of land with 
agricultural productivity any longer. Arid and fallow land owned by Gujars became highly 
desirable during the building of urban centres and highways (Gururani 2019). Gujars soon 
entered the real estate market in Urban Delhi, along with Jats and Yadavs to formed the 
dominant political class in the 1970s-80s. As observed later in the case of urban villages of 
Jamia Nagar, the new non-Muslim capitalist class quickly moved out of the congested lal doras 
(original settlement areas in rural villages) to settle in the planned colonies of Delhi. 
Spatial Expansion and Urbanization in Delhi 
The spatial expansion and patterns of settlement in Delhi are closely linked to the flows of 
migration in the city. In the period between declaration of Delhi as the new capital of British 
India in 1911 to Indian independence in 1947, the population of Delhi almost quadrupled from 
238,000 to 900,000 (Dupont 2000). During the Indian partition, Delhi received about 470,000 
refugees from the Punjab and Sindh regions, while about 320,000 Muslims left Delhi and 




The multi-directional spatial expansion of Delhi’s urban area doubled between 1941 to 1961 to 
accommodate this drastic demographic expansion. Post 1981, population, and settlement 
growth in the rural peripheries of Delhi was taking place at a much higher rate (9.6%) than its 
urban core (3.8%). 
However, the parts of Delhi that were still 
considered as ‘rural villages’ as per the 1991 
Census had more in common with urban 
agglomerations than their rural 
counterparts in India. With the ‘failure’ of 
planning institutions in Delhi to respond to 
the housing needs of the new urban-rural 
populations, growth of unauthorized 
colonies on previously agricultural land 
began after the first Delhi Master Plan of 
1962. This method of urbanizing in the rural 
hinterlands of Delhi is what Roy (2005) 
recognizes as production “unplannability” 
by the state. Roy argues that informality as 
a state of exception has become the 
“formal order of urbanization” (p.147).  
 
Map 2: Spatial Expansion of Urbanized 
Zones in Delhi (1950-1997). Source: 
(Dupont 2000) 
Socio-spatial relations as products of planning, and in response to planning techniques by the 
Delhi state are discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters. Production of space, here, is 
understood to be a reflection of the conflicts and tensions that arise from various social 





Chapter 3: Delhi’s Institutional History 
In 2018, a report on the ‘Situation Analysis of Property records in Delhi’ (IIHS 2018) concluded 
that not only did Delhi not have a single custodian of land and property records for all of the 
National Capital Territory, but also that there is no one record or format across the various 
governance and planning typologies. This ambiguity in records and record keepers of Delhi 
suggests that the slice of society that is in fact recorded and documented by the state, is not 
representative of the actual activities taking place in the city. Which brings us to the question, 
‘if it’s not the reality that is being documented then what actions are being taken based on the 
part of our lives that is being documented’? 
In a reflection on the slippage between ‘paper realities’ and ‘lived realities’, Tarlo (2001) 
explains that the value in studying state records lies not so much in the statistics they produce, 
but in the insights they provide about the state’s changing functions and priorities. An analysis 
of Delhi’s records makes visible a history of violence in the form of dispossession and 
displacement. The Economic Survey of Delhi 2008-09 switches between the two unrelated 
metrics of legality of ownership and condition of housing, to state that only 23.7% of the 
population in Delhi lives in “planned colonies”, with majority of the remaining population living 
in areas categorised as “slum designated areas” – 19.1%, “JJ Clusters7” – 14.8% and 
“regularised-unauthorised colonies” – 12.7% (Government of Delhi 2009). The Economic Survey 
of Delhi 2018-19, further simplifies this assessment  by only mentioning the “number of these 
settlement types” in Delhi and attempts to hide its continued failure to provide adequate 
housing to Delhi residents by completely omitting the “percentage of population” statistics 
(Government of Delhi 2019).  
This section of the paper analyses the layers of history of land record keeping and the 
development practices undertaken by various institutions of land governance in Delhi, to 
explain - why typologies of land development tied to socio-spatial realties in Delhi produce 
statistics like the one highlighted above by the Economic Survey of Delhi? Here I analyse the 
 




colonial practices of land record keeping and distribution, before moving on to study existing 
post-colonial institutions of planning in Delhi and how they have internalized these colonial 
practices of land ownership and development. 
State, Revenue and Land 
The British Empire’s major interest in developing a system of land records was primarily for the 
purpose of revenue collection. The British system of land administration and revenue collection 
was strongly informed by the capitalist notions of the English Common Law which viewed land 
as property and associated exchange value with land (Harris 2004). However, when confronted 
with the complex rights of uses of land in the colony, the Government of British India realised 
that it could not simply erase the existing terminologies of land use and revenue collection in 
Delhi. This oriental empiricism led to a conceptual layering of meanings and practices 
associated with lands like waqf and nazul, which continued to be referred as the same in 
revenue records and judicial purposes (Pradhan and Lal 2019). The cultural values associated 
with them, however, underwent considerable mutation due to land administration and change 
in ownership titling system under the new Imperial administration. Making holdings or estates 
waqf, for instance, meant endowing an estate onto family members for the continuance of 
family honour and prestige. But by the end of the nineteenth century, the pressure of British 
jurisprudence transformed the nature of waqf from familial to charitable endowments for 
public or religious welfare (Kozlowski 1980b). 
Agricultural land in British India fell under one of three the systems of revenue collection: (a) 
zamindari or landlord-based system), (b) raiyatwari or individual cultivator-based system and 
(c) mahalwari or village-based system. Delhi (under the Punjab Province) since 1857, came 
under the mahalwari system where the village bodies jointly owned the village and were 
responsible for land revenue from the Revenue Village. The composition of this village body, 
however, was usually very homogenous and often consolidated in the hands of upper caste 
families loyal to the crown (Banerjee and Iyer 2005). The British system of land revenue 
collection thereby created a regime of private property ownership, which has since continued 




These systems of revenue collection, as discussed by (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996) his book Common 
Lands and Customary Law, marked the demolition of common property in the Punjab region 
during the British period. Kaul argues that the British government established the political 
assumption of village control in the hands of landowners, as they took the central stage in the 
institution of agrarian land administration. Hence, the British system of land-revenue 
administration directly contributed to the decline of joint control of common land resources 
within villages and the rise of private property rights amongst land owning higher caste farming 
families, which the author refers to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Ibid., p.4). Kaul also 
remarks how these practices reveal the intention of the Colonial state to ‘fix’ the nomad and 
convert him into a cultivator. During this period, the state began large scale acquisition through 
eminent domain, to become a major landowner. Acquisitions under “planned development of 
Delhi” were undertaken to expand roads, railways, and canal networks for the urbanization of 
Delhi. The colonial state here became the primary force behind the transformation of agrarian 
land into urban land. 
Institutionalized Expansion of Urban Delhi  
In 1907-08, all village land outside the old walled city of Delhi was surveyed and underwent the 
process of Chakbandi (village consolidation) to enhance the British government’s revenue 
collection. Since the Britishers were concerned with collecting revenue only from agricultural 
land, all village land inhabited by people (Aabadi) was circled as Aabadi Deh and left un-
surveyed. This spatial land record system identified the quality of soil based on its fertility for 
cultivation to determine revenue collection rate, thus eliminating the need to officially 
document any use or customary rights associated with a particular piece of land. In cases of 
land acquisition by the state, ownership rights could be proved by producing land records from 
the Revenue Department. However, claims to compensation by any tenant farmers or other 
users of land was determined by a Patwari (land record keeper) of the Revenue Village, based 
on the documents that non-owners were able to produce to prove their use rights. 
Shortly after the consolidation of revenue villages into Delhi, in 1938, the Delhi Improvement 




commissioned in 1937 by the British State to assess the conditions of urban congestion and 
poverty in Delhi (Legg 2006). Hume’s report presented a picture of crumbling infrastructure and 
overcrowding in Delhi and suggested that residents be moved out of the walled city and 
surrounding slum areas. Like Hume, Patrick Geddes also criticized the congestion and 
unsanitary conditions in Delhi and proposed his own techniques of diagnostic survey and 
conservative surgery to improve urban areas within imperial colonies. These “improvements” 
to Delhi proposed between 1937-47 under DIT were never successfully realized, but in essence 
sought a “material representation of a viable colonial modernity” (ibid., p.182). These imported 
practices of ‘development’ that aimed to improve spatial planning, promote public sanitation 
and make land parcels available for easy marketization by removing all ‘public nuisances’ and 
‘health hazards’ in surrounding areas informed the first Master Plan of Delhi prepared by the 
Delhi Development Authority in 1962. 
73 years after Independence from the British Empire, Delhi Development Authority (formed in 
1957), continues to use the same revenue maps as the starting point of all spatial land records 
in Delhi. This uncertainty, in rights to land use and appropriate compensation in cases of 
acquisition, continues to affect land-less occupants and users in these Urbanized Revenue 
Villages of Delhi. For people owning property inside the Aabadi Deh (also known as Lal Dora 
areas) there is no record keeping that can prove their claim to the land on which their property 
is built. Proof of property ownership here can be shown by producing either utility bills, 
property tax receipts or validation letters with property numbers from the village Tehsildar 
(revenue officer). 
Delhi Development Authority (DDA), formed under the Delhi Development Act of 1957, is often 
referred to as the “successor of Delhi Improvement Trust (DIT)”. DDA inherited all properties of 
DIT including all Nazul8 lands and all 23 Nazul Revenue Estates owned by the DIT. In addition to 
this, DDA is also responsible for managing all Ministry of Rehabilitation’s land, Land and 
Development Office’s land, Urbanized Gaon Sabha (village body)’ land, and land acquired 
 
8 Under the Mughal Administration, Nazul lands were Crown land under the Emperor. However, in current 




through acquisition that was never allotted for the intended “public purpose” – essentially 
creating a huge land bank owned by DDA (Jolly 2010). This makes DDA, the biggest landowner 
in Delhi, very much like the British Colonial State between 1857-1947. 
Once a revenue village is declared ‘Urban’, under the Section 507 of the Delhi Municipal 
Corporation Act of 1957, it is not governed by the Delhi Land Reforms Act of 1954 anymore. 
Which amongst other administrative changes, also results in the withdrawal of the Revenue 
Department’s responsibility to update land records. Non-maintenance of inventory of land 
acquired by DDA has resulted in huge parcels of land scattered across the city that DDA has 
never taken possession of. Many of these lands all across Delhi, allotted to DDA but never taken 
possession, gradually have been taken over by original owners or land mafias, who fully aware 
of the legal status of the land, have sold it on market prices to unsuspecting buyers. This 
ambiguity is a result of using land records created for the “non-urban”, for “urban” planning 
purposes. Further, records which do not show the actual use on these lands, have become one 
of the major contributing factors behind entire stretches of neighbourhoods being 
characterized as “unauthorized development”, as highlighted in the Economic Survey of Delhi 
2008-09. 
‘Failure’ of Institutionalized Planning? 
Immediately after independence in 1947, Delhi Lease and Finance (DLF), a private developer 
company started buying large parcels of agricultural land and developed them into elite 
neighbourhoods throughout Delhi. DLF also held on to large chunks of land in anticipation of 
future increase in land prices. DDA, in 1957, was hence formed as a response to DLF’s 
speculative practices and entrusted with all publicly held land in the city (Ghertner 2010). The 
first Master Plan of Delhi (MPD), prepared in 1962, allotted a quarter of all residentially zoned 
land, owned by DDA, for the purpose of low-income housing for new migrants. DDA and its 
private contractors secured migrant labourers from the neighbouring provinces of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Haryana, etc. As the first Master Plan was followed by a boom in the 
construction sector, Delhi witnessed a huge influx of migrants from adjoining provinces, and 




and their families (Ghertner 2010). The low-income housing constructed was not used to house 
these migrant workers, who continued to live in the semi-permanent and poorly constructed 
housing. In fact DDA achieved less that 10% of its low-income housing target in the first 50 
years of its existence (Verma 2002).  
Most slum designated areas and JJCs in Delhi started off as labour camps and still 
predominantly continue to house migrants that cannot afford housing in ‘planned’ residential 
areas. Illegality, poor infrastructure services and the absence of tenure security, then become 
the price that the economically weaker class (often lower caste) of urban India pays for 
affordable shelter and housing in its cities. Local politicians within the city quickly realized the 
electoral potential of incorporating migrants in the city within the political umbrella. Residents 
of these “illegal” settlements have also, in turn, increased the legality of their occupied land 
plots by securing voter IDs and ration cards (welfare cards) associated with these addresses, a 
rights-based negotiation that Benjamin (2014) has called ‘occupancy urbanism’. A quarter to a 
half of population of India’s large cities lives on public land which India’s development state 
chose to overlook, and by extension indirectly supported until the recent years. Ghertner 
(2014) argues that the history of slums and other ‘illegally’ occupied settlements in Delhi is in 
fact “a history of the public city” and the ongoing politics of slum demolitions throughout Delhi 
under different state governments “marks the end of the public city” (p.1562). 
DDA, since the 1990s, has been increasingly involved in the selling of ‘un-utilized’ land under its 
possession, thereby participating in the same private property land market system that it was 
established to put an end to. Additionally, DDA’s most important task since its inception has 
been to construct low-income housing in the city. However, a closer look at the quantity of 
housing by ‘income-type’ produced by DDA in the last 60 years, along with the statistics of 
housing shortage by ‘category of income’, present a picture of neglect where housing subsidies 
have been channelled towards the urban elites much more than the poor (Maitra 1991). With 
DDA and Delhi state government’s categorical neglect in providing affordable housing to the 
landless working class migrants, this housing gap was filled with an almost equal growth of 




These ways of city building, however, operate in special niches that are not strictly aligned with 
the formal structures of real estate, finance, and planning. Taking place within the important 
nodes of the city, in complete sight of the state and in constant negotiation with the Master 
Plan, these peripheral developments continue to challenge the institutional logics of planning. 
However, identified by Roy (2011) as the “grey spacing taking place at the periphery of 
peripheries”, when state defined ‘illegality’ is accompanied with acute stigmatization and 
second-class citizenship identities— as in the case of Muslim colonies in Delhi— grey spaces are 
tolerated only as long as they can be managed by state power. 
Bhan (2013), in his analysis of histories and categories of state defined informality and illegality 
of housing settlements in Delhi, problematizes the popular narratives of the “failure of 
planning”. Using Roy (2005)’s notion of urban informality as a type of governance, instead of a 
description of a bounded space or sector which exists transversally with the formal/legal 
systems in the city, Bhan argues that it is the Delhi Master Plan (and not a failure of its 
implementation) that produces and governs irregularity in the city. Further, the flexibility in 
Delhi state’s ability to decide what is informal and how it differs from illegal, as well as the 
continuously negotiated process of regularizing the informal is what Roy (2004, cited in Bhan 
2013) terms as “a spatial mode of governance”. 
In recent years, the Delhi state has undertaken a range of efforts to ‘regularize’ unauthorized 
colonies with the promise of carrying them across the line to full legitimacy. Popularly referred 
to as “regularization drives”, these drives are a point of continuous contention and debate 
before every political cycle, with regularization being on the agenda of all political parties 
across the spectrum. In the latest drive in 2007-08, the Government of Delhi put forward 
guidelines for submitting regularization applications and invited unauthorized colonies to 





Map 3: Sample of detailed layout plans submitted. A compulsory requirement for regularization 
applications. Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) would bear the expense of hiring private 
architects, surveyors, and enumerators to submit such extensively detailed applications. 
Source: Delhi Development Authority’s portal9 for viewing regularization applications. 
 
In response, 1,639 colonies (including 17 from Jamia Nagar) filed for regularization, and 
suddenly the government, private developers and educational institutions interested in 
unauthorized colony statistics, had public access to detailed information on every colony. These 
applications not only have layouts of built and unbuilt structures within these 1,639 colonies, 
but also information, like names of head of the families, phone numbers, and level of access to 
public infrastructure at the plot level. This apparent ‘consent’ from residents in disclosing 
information at the plot level, which meant disclosing information at the household level, stems 
from a lack of access to basic physical infrastructure. Within the unauthorized colonies, there is 
 
9 As a methodological safekeeping measure, direct information to access this public portal has been intentionally 




also a desire to be able to participate in the formal banking system and land markets which 
until now they have been denied. Which makes this ‘consent’ nothing but a coercive tactic by 
the Delhi state to access information on these colonies, which they themselves have been 
unable to gather through their own ‘official’ processes. 
 
 
Image 1 and 2: Excerpts from a regularization application, detailing out the total area, number 
of vacant/occupied plots, total population, date of formation, land acquisition notifications etc.  
Source: Delhi Development Authority’s portal for viewing regularization applications. 
 
This downloading of responsibility onto the resident welfare associations (RWAs) since 2008, to 
undertake the entire process of regularization at the neighbourhood level— including 
surveying, data collection from individual families as well as public service providers— is very 
much a part of a series of policy introductions by the Delhi state to decentralize governance and 




While some decentralization policies, like the 2008 Regularization Scheme, have added more 
onus on marginalized communities to prove their legality, others like the Bhagidari10 
(partnership) scheme, as illustrated by Chakrabarti (2007) and Ghertner (2008), have resulted in 
the increased mobilization of Delhi’s middle class (often upper caste) within the governance 
sphere. The increased representation of middle class interests in municipal politics has not only 
resulted in increased public spending in middle and upper class neighbourhoods, but also 
added to the growing intolerance towards slums and other unauthorized developments by the 
city’s poor, in and around these affluent neighbourhoods. 
This ‘rational’, controlled, and pacified middle class which is eager to participate in the 
development politics within Delhi, hopes for a clean and orderly urban landscape which can 
facilitate increased land and property rents in their neighbourhoods. On the other hand, only 2 
out of 17 RWA’s operating within various Muslim neighbourhoods of Jamia Nagar have been 
successful under the 2008 regularization drive. The following chapter on ‘Muslim Colonies in 
Delhi’ situates this history of land development and decentralized urban governance in detail 
and reflects on the Delhi state’s flexible dealings with land, capital, and local politics within 









Chapter 4: Muslim Colonies in Delhi 
Jamia Nagar, much like the Muslim neighborhoods in Old Delhi, is remembered by residents 
and visitors from the rest of Delhi in reference to as a ‘chaotic food hub’, or by events in public 
memory when the educated Muslim turned out to be a terrorist11. Years of othering and 
criminalization of Muslims in India has fed directly into the making of recent legislations — like 
the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 and the National Register of Citizens12— where the 
Indian state is no longer fearful of losing popular support with the official demotion of Muslims 
as second-class citizens of the country. On the other hand, the commodification of the ‘Muslim 
experience’ which includes ittars, kababs and other sought after culinary offerings has led to 
the creation of what Jamil (2017) calls the ‘bourgeois public sphere’, where the chaos of Muslim 
life has been put on public display for the consumer. 
This chapter offers a history of the people and places in Jamia Nagar to make sense of the 
experiences of Muslim exclusion in Delhi. It does so by analzsing markets of land development, 
public negotiations for regularization of unauthorized colonies in the area, and by offering a 
reflection on the people’s struggle for participation in the political and economic networks of 
the city. By noting the class and locational differences in the discriminatory process adopted by 
Delhi state in the creation of these ‘zones of exception’ (Roy 2011, Gregory 2009), I argue that 
the resultant hierarchies and segregations amongst Muslims have not only contributed to the 
increased social control of Muslim subjects but also to the continued legitimacy of the violent 
state. This inquiry arising from state practices of illegalization of space, through conditions 
imposed on land ownership and rights of developments, then contributes to the maintenance 
of socio-political categories that are essential to the larger Hindutva nation building project of 
marginalization and domination. 
 
 
11 For reference read Amrita Ibrahim (2013) ‘Who is a bigger terrorist than the police?’ Photography as a politics of 
encounter in Delhi's Batla House, South Asian Popular Culture, 11:2, 133-144.  






The research and analysis for this section of the paper is primarily done through a study of 
various state documents in reference to the three urban villages (Okhla, Jogabai and Jasola) 
under consideration, including notifications and resolutions passed by the Delhi Development 
Authority (DDA) and the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD). 
Observations on various land acquisitions and subsequent allotments have been compiled from 
DDA’s Land Management and Information System (LMIS). Details of land and property 
development in the unauthorized colonies of Jamia Nagar have been taken from the 
applications submitted by the various resident welfare associations (RWAs) during the 2008 
Regularization Drives. A study of the limited (often completely absent) materialization of these 
acquisitions on ground, in the three urban villages, was undertaken through field visits between 
March 2018 to August 2018.  
For this paper I have also drawn from previous observations during a 5 month long self-directed 
research project on “Tracing the Development History of Revenue Villages in South-East Delhi”. 
This project was undertaken with the supervision of Deepika Jha at the Indian Institute for 
Human Settlements; (IIHS) Centre for Land Governance, Delhi. All references to observations 
and analysis arising from this study will be cited as Zaidi (2018) in this paper. 
This primary research material gathered during the 5-month long research period is 
accompanied by extensive informal interactions with residents and ethnographic observations 
of Jamia Nagar’s Muslim neighborhoods which arise from my membership in this heterogenous 
group. 25 years of lived experiences as a Jamia Nagar resident, including 5 years as an 
architecture student at Jamia Millia Islamia, and my continued familial ties to these 
neighborhoods have helped me develop a keen eye to contextualize contemporary changes 





Land Acquisitions and Subsequent Illegalization 
Located about 10 miles south-east from the municipal limits of the Delhi Province in the 1880s, 
the Okhla, Jogabai, and Jasola revenue villages (present day Jamia Nagar) were sparsely 
populated rural villages inhabited mostly by Ghosis and Gujjars. Ghosis who are lower caste 
Muslims, are a landless class in North India who were involved in animal rearing and worked as 
seasonal labourers. Gujjars residing in Okhla where lower caste Hindus, and also pastoralists; 
however, after the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 they were pushed to settle in mostly arid 
regions like Okhla and Jogabai where they became small landholders (Gururani 2019). 
In an account of lands and land transfers in 
Jamia Nagar, Nadvi (1997) in Jamia ki 
Zammeeno ki Kahani (The story of Jamia’s 
lands) observes that until 1930s most land 
around the lal dora13 were vast stretches of 
forest with very low agricultural productivity. 
After the establishment of the Delhi 
Improvement Trust (DIT) in 1937, a report 
published in 1940 showed the three study 
villages to be lying outside of the Municipality 
of Delhi, but within the jurisdiction of DIT. The 
first state acquisition in Okhla was undertaken 
in 1939 for the purpose of widening the road 
which connected these rural villages to the 
Municipality of Delhi (C-DAC n.d.).  
 
13 Inhabited village settlement area demarcated on 
revenue maps with red ink. 
 
Map 4: Map showing Jurisdiction of Delhi 




Jamia Millia Islamia14, after relocating its campus to Okhla in 1935, had a significant impact on 
the population influx in Jamia Nagar of Muslims from adjoining provinces seeking higher 
education and professional training. By 1947, population density inside the Okhla Aabadi Deh 
had increased drastically and the first neighbourhoods to come up outside the Aabadi Deh 
areas were Noor Nagar and Harijan Basti (settlement for lower-caste workers). Maps published 
after the 1951 census by the Town Planning Organization (TPO) under the Ministry of Health, 
depict the population size of Okhla between 501-750 people. Maps, made in 1956 by TPO also 
show Okhla Village as a high-density residential area with an approximate population of 1,900 
people in and around the Okhla rural village, including the Agra Canal housing, Jamia Millia 
Islamia’s staff quarters and other residential colonies (Zaidi 2018). Around the late 1950s, 
commercial establishments started coming up inside the Okhla Aabadi Deh on the two main 
internal roads (Mudholi 1965). The widespread right-wing Hindutva mobilization during the 
1990s, including the 2002 Gujrat riots, resulted in extreme alienation of Muslims in cities who 
were denied housing in non-Muslim neighbourhoods (Jamil 2017). Various neighborhoods 
within Jamia Nagar underwent an unprecedented expansion during this period with a surge of 
migration from various provinces of North-India, especially Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Nadvi 
1997). 
On the land development front, between 1947-50, Jamia Millia Islamia rapidly bought land in 
the Okhla and Jogabai Revenue Villages. But in the absence of a comprehensive master plan, 
the aggregation and development of this land was quite sporadic in nature. Jamia Millia Islamia 
was allotted large parcels of land by the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development 
for its planned development15.  It is during this time that Jamia Millia Islamia also started leasing 
out land to attract and settle more staff and faculty in its vicinity, and by 1952-55 had begun 
constructing various quarters and housing societies for its employees and students. Due to its 
role as a state designated provider of housing, most of the ‘planned’ housing in Jamia Nagar is 
 
14 Muslim minority educational institute formed in 1920. Central University managed by the Ministry of Human 
Resource Development (erstwhile Ministry of Education), Government of India  




affiliated to the University, while the ‘unplanned’ neighborhoods are occupied by people who 
constructed their houses privately (Zaidi 2018). 
 
Map 5: A hand drawn map of the Okhla Revenue Village was published in Jamia ki Kahani (Story 
of Jamia) in 1965 which illustrates the Aabadi Deh area within Okhla village and adjoining 
boundaries with the revenue villages of Jogabai, Jasola and Bahadurpur. 
After taking over the responsibilities of DIT in 1957, the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) 
passed a resolution in 1966 for the ‘Redevelopment of Okhla Village’16. Okhla, Jogabai and 
Jasola villages were also declared ‘urbanized’ in the same year under section 507 of the Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act of 1957. These villages, post declaration, were not governed by the 
Delhi Land Reforms Act of 1954 any longer, which meant the withdrawal of the Revenue 
Department’s responsibility to update land records. This resulted in the non-maintenance of a 
public inventory of land acquired by DDA in the subsequent years. 
 




Between 1959-1998, through various land acquisition awards, Delhi Development Authority 
(DDA) declared its intention to acquire land parcels for various urban development purposes. 
However, due to a combination of reasons —including grievances in amount and eligibility for 
compensation, departmental delays in taking possession of acquired land and subsequent sales 
to unsuspecting buyers— some of the largest and most densely inhabited neighbourhoods in 
Jamia Nagar were built on lands which on record, was DDA’s to develop on. This series of failed 
land acquisition attempts by the Delhi state, without taking into consideration the increasing 
Muslim migration and its housing requirements (existing and projected), has led to about 525 
acres17 (212.46 hectares) of built-up area (residential and commercial) in Jamia Nagar being 
recognized as ‘unauthorized’ developments which exist in contradiction to the larger master 
planning schemes in the city. 
Table 1: History of failed Land Acquisition or absence of land use change as per Delhi Master 










Failed Land Acquisition Award (LAA) and Allotment Schemes 
under DDA 
Nai Basti (Harijan 
Colony) 
1957 7.58 acres Harijan Colony for lower caste Hindus, is one of the oldest 
neighborhoods in Jamia Nagar, and predates the first Master 
Plan of Delhi, 1962. Here building construction began without 
the ‘Land Use Change’ prescribed for previous agricultural land. 
Zakir Nagar and 
Mehboob Nagar 
1970-80 35.47 acres All Land Acquisition Awards in these areas were issued years 
after the residents had built their properties in various blocks of 
these neighbourhoods. With the earliest being issued in 1984 
(i.e. about 10 years later) for construction of National Highway-
2. In 1992 (about 20 years later) large parts of these 
neighborhoods were notified to be acquired for the purpose of 
reclaiming the flood plains of river Yamuna. All these 
acquisitions (including LAA 5 in 1997 and LAA 51 in 1998) failed 
to dislocate the residents of these neighborhoods who had 
already built permanent houses and had gotten them 
registered with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. 
 
17 Compiled from 2008 Regularization Applications submitted by the Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) of 




Batla House 1975-76 210.72 acres Same as Zakir Nagar, in 1992 (about 20 years later) large parts 
of these neighborhoods were notified to be acquired for the 
purpose of reclaiming the flood plains of river Yamuna. In 1998 
again, DDA attempted to acquire land and allotted it to the 
Delhi Horticulture Department. All attempts to displace, evict, 
or compensate residents from these lands have failed. 
Noor Nagar and 
Noor Nagar 
Extension 
1981-87 17.3 acres In 1969 through LAA 24, DDA allotted large portions of these 
neighbourhoods to the Delhi Horticulture Department which 
never took possession of the allotted lands. Between 1982-84 
during the peak expansion in these neighborhoods, through 
LAA 5, 94, 95 and 76, DDA attempted to reclaim these lands; 
however, failed to evict residents who had already built 
permanent houses (many had begun to pay property taxes). 
Okhla Vihar 1981 18 acres Same as Noor Nagar, the land on which this neighbourhood 
today stands was notified in 1969 to be acquired by the Delhi 
Horticulture Department which never took physical possession 
of these lands. 20 years later, private developers subdivided 




1985-88 4.41 acres In 1984 during the peak expansion in these neighborhoods, 
DDA notified these lands for acquisition under LAA 95 to be 
allotted to Jamia Millia Islamia for its planned expansion. 
Abul Fazal Enclave 1978-81 75.12 acres Two Land Acquisition Awards, 94 and 17, were issued in 1984 
(about 10 years after housing settlement) and 1992 (20 years 
after housing settlement). However, both awards could not be 
carried out as residents had already built registered permanent 
houses (many had begun to pay property taxes). 
Shaheen Bagh 1985-92 142.9 acres Same as Above 
Jogabai 1990 12.52 acres Immediately after the Jogabai neighbourhood saw an influx of 
residents and new construction, DDA through LAA 19 (in 1992) 
attempted to reclaim some parts of the neighbourhood as the 
flood plain of Yamuna and remaining for the purpose of 
National Highway – Kalindi Bypass road link. 
(Data Source: Column 3 and 4 from the 2008 Regularization Applications submitted by the Resident Welfare 
Associations (RWAs) to Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD). Column 4 compiled from 
analysis of Land Acquisition Awards issued by the Delhi Development Authority with the on-ground observations in 




Key observations emerging from the above data sets suggest: 
Firstly, most claims of urbanization suggest a straightforward process of acquisition of 
agricultural or unused land, followed by compensation to claimants and users and subsequent 
consolidation and subdivision of land for sale. However, as observed in the case of 
unauthorized colonies in Jamia Nagar, Land Acquisition through the state’s eminent domain 
was used as a tool to displace residents on already inhabited land. When DDA was unable to 
compensate and remove residents (who in neighbourhoods like Zakira Nagar, Batla House, Abul 
Fazal and Shaheen Bagh had been residing there for over 20 years), the incomplete acquisition 
process created informality in the form of ‘unauthorized’ colonies.  
Secondly, in colonies like Noor Nagar, Noor Nagar Extension and Okhla Vihar, land was acquired 
by DDA and compensation paid to landowners. However, in the absence of public record 
keeping and lack of process of physical possession and handover (to departments like Public 
Works Department and Delhi Horticulture Department), land that was left unclaimed for 15-20 
years was taken over by local land developers and mafias who subdivided the land and sold the 
plots to unsuspecting buyers. 
Thirdly, until 2011 in the absence of clear land ownership deeds, known as Record of Rights, all 
land transfers in unauthorized colonies in Delhi (including neighbourhoods in Jamia Nagar) were 
made through general power-of-attorney (GPA). GPAs, registered at the Sub-Registrar’s 
(Revenue Department) office, were being used as a de facto method of not only transferring 
rights of land use but also assumed to be converting agricultural land to residential purposes. 
However, in 2011, the Supreme Court of India declared GPAs an illegal instrument of 
transferring rights, titles or interest in an immovable property (Raveendran, Patnaik, and 
Gokhale 2011). GPAs were now restricted in their ability to only be able to transfer ‘right of 
possession’ and not the ‘right to be a legal owner’. This 2011 order essentially declared all 
transfers of residential and commercial properties in these unauthorized colonies to be illegal, 
until formal Record of Rights (RoR) weren’t obtained by the owners. To obtain an RoR, these 
colonies first had to successfully undergo regularization, thereby creating a gordian knot with 




So far, only 2 out of 17 Residents Welfare Associations operating within the 9 Muslim 
neighborhoods of Jamia Nagar have been successful in getting their applications and layouts 
approved under the 2008 regularization drive. This raises major concerns on the repercussion 
of the self-reported data that is now available publicly, as well as the changes in the local 
governance structures within these colonies. In a state bid to locate and quantify illegality, self-
enumeration exercises like the 2008 regularization drive have only resulted in increased 
visibility of the Muslim population residing in these unauthorized colonies in front of the state 
authorities, who after the 2020 Delhi anti-Muslim pogrom have clearly indicated their desire to 
establish a stronger control over the city’s Muslim population. 
The establishment of Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) within these colonies has relieved 
the state government and DDA of its responsibility to manage illegality. The decentralization of 
responsibility without financial support or autonomy is what Roy (2009) calls a move towards 
‘civic governmentality’. While RWAs might seem like a localized collective action towards 
greater housing rights in the city, it’s the same disenfranchised groups (including daily wage 
workers, illiterate, women, disabled persons etc.) who are often excluded from this process of 
self-governance. Another guideline under the 2008 regularization drive, is the payment of 
development charges (post regularization) by individuals registered under these regularization 
applications. While the responsibility of infrastructural development in planned colonies is 
primarily that of the state, Zimmer (2012) argues that in the case of unauthorized colonies, a 
new understanding of citizenship and public-private participation emerges, where the residents 
share the cost of development in the form of penalization for an illegal existence. An 
“illegalization” that was created by the state in the first place. 
Shifting Illegalities 
In 1961 and 1969, the Delhi state government undertook one of its earliest known 
regularization drives and subsequently regularized 154 unauthorized colonies in Delhi. After 
which, a series of relatively less successful regularization drives were carried out in 1977 and 
early 1993 (Sethi 2008). However, the 2007 regularization that began under then Chief Minister 




Nagar), is not only the largest but also the longest carried out process, which continues till date. 
Major negotiations have taken place, before every state electoral cycle between various 
stakeholders (including RWAs, land and property developers, middlemen and elected 
representatives) on the issue of ‘cut-off date’ for regularization.  
With elections just around the corner in early 2020, Aam Admi Party (AAP)’s Delhi chief 
Minister Arvind Kejriwal18 reopened the discussion on regularization in June 2019 and 
suggested that the cut-off-date for regularization be shifted from January 2015 to March 2019. 
The new cut-off date brought the total tally of colonies under consideration to 1,797. Kejriwal 
also requested the central government19 to recognize general power-of-attorney (GPA) as a 
valid document for property registry (HT Correspondent 2019). In December 2019, 2 months 
before Delhi state election, the Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led central government passed The 
National Capital Territory of Delhi (Recognition of Property Rights of Residents in Unauthorized 
Colonies) Act. Through this legislation, the central government reopened the possibility for 
property owners within unauthorized colonies (post approval) to be able to convert their GPAs 
into conveyance deeds or authorization slips (The Gazette of India 2019). In other words, this 
legislation provided the avenue for previously untapped land and property markets to be legally 
owned, transferred, mortgaged etc., without mentioning anything about the lack of 
infrastructure provisioning or overall public development within these colonies.  
Delhi state government’s urges to the central government to bypass the processes outlined by 
its own appointee (i.e. the chairman of DDA) and the National government’s legislation to 
overturn a 2011 Supreme Court order, is a cyclically noticed tactic of tying spatial governance to 
electoral politics. The 2019 property rights legislation also paves the way for the ‘unauthorized’ 
citizen to transform itself (along with its private property rights) into a neoliberal citizen. A 
citizenship focused on consumerism and increased integration into the city’s economy; but only 
upto the extent that is profitable for financial institutions. 
 
18 Leader of Aam Admi Party (AAP), formed in 2012 




In contrast to this openness to include these settlements into the legal sphere during times of 
opportunity and public pursual, in September 2020 the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in 
the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic began its latest eviction and demolition drive of over 100 
houses constructed on the extended floodplains of the Yamuna River on the edge of one of 
Jamia Nagar’s neighbourhoods, Batla House (Malik 2020). In an interplay of pick-and-choose of 
legislation like the National Green Tribunal, which illegalizes all construction on the riverbank, 
to the convenient dismissal of the Delhi Laws (Special Provision) Act, 2006 which requires 
rehabilitation prior to eviction, the September demolition comes is part of a series of recent 
state sanctioned legislative violence on the Muslim residents in Delhi; particularly the poor. 
On the other hand, the Akshardham temple, as well as, Hindu spiritual leader Sri Sri Ravi 
Shankar’s Art of Living centre in Delhi, despite being constructed on the flood plains of Yamuna, 
are not subjected to violent demolition. Instead, such establishments which are frequented by 
political and social elites in the city are tolerated, or at max imposed with fines (after rounds of 
appeals and negotiations) for the purposes of ‘restoration of the ecology’ through other 
methods (Bhatnagar 2017). These different attitudes towards different populations are an 
example of the flexibility of sovereign power to shift the boundaries of what is included and 
excluded from within the spectrums of legality and formality in the city. It is this differentiated 
administration of spaces and mode of neoliberal governmentality that Ong (2006) calls an 
“extraordinary departure in policy”. The normalization of these exceptions to the applicability 
of master planning and development policies has enabled the Delhi state to define who and 
under which condition is operating under an “exception” to law.  
The growth of Jamia Nagar therefore can be understood as a production of space through its 
exclusion from the land markets and financial supply systems in Delhi. Jamil (2017), in her 
analysis of the speculative practices around the built environment in Jamia Nagar, observes that 
local developers and builders in these neighbourhoods are able to develop and sell housing at 
an increased profit to the Muslim residents who have little choice to settle elsewhere in the 
city. This niche market of redeveloping old single/double story houses into mid rise apartments 
has been undertaken by local developers who, due to their existing social networks and 




unauthorized colonies, where more prominent private developers operating in the city are not 
willing to invest. Land and property values in Muslim colonies, more than being indicative of the 
quality of the physical space itself, are determined by its ‘Muslim value’.  
Historian Grace Elizabeth Hale (1999), in her study of the culture of segregation of ghettoized 
and criminalized black spaces, argues that black residents in Southern America were able to 
own their neighborhoods in very limited capacities. Rather, these become sites of lynching, 
police brutality, and inequitable public development provisioning, and were avoided by white 
homebuyers and business. Similarly, the flight of upper and middle class Hindus from Jamia 
Nagar and the gradual formation of gated, Muslim-only lanes in North-East Delhi have 
contributed to the solidification of neighbourhoods on religious bases in the city. In spite of 
existing under different legalities and housing different classes of Muslims within them, the 
planned resettlement colonies in North-East Delhi and the unauthorized colonies of Jamia 
Nagar face similar stigmatization as ‘mini Pakistans’ (see Bhasin 2020 and OpIndia Staff 2020). 
While Muslim residents in different neighbourhoods of Jamia Nagar and North-East Delhi 
belong to starkly different socio-economic backgrounds, yet the similarities in the built urban 
fabric and material deprivation is indicative of the state of exclusion of Muslim neighborhoods 
from the larger development processes in the city. 
    
Image 3 and 4: Internal residential lanes in Abul Fazal, Jamia Nagar (left) and Seelampur (right), a 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The subordination of Muslim labor and the immobility of Muslim capital in hyper-segregated 
Indian cities have led to restrictions on the Muslim citizen’s autonomy over their lived 
conditions. These have also ensured that Muslim citizen’s integration into the urban economy is 
controlled in a manner that is highly profitable for professional firms, businesses and financial 
institutions (see Jamil 2011 and Rajagopal 2010). Combined with state practices of illegalization 
and territorial understandings of lawlessness and threats to national security, one’s mere 
association with Muslim residential areas or educational institutions is incarcerating enough for 
one to be considered as a part of a suspicious and aggressive population. 
This territorialized religious segregation and 
narratives of differentiated living practices 
(including food and clothing) of Muslims has 
shaped Hindus’ and other communities’ 
(including Muslims who live outside of 
these ghettos) spatial imaginations of 
Muslim spaces. With growing anxieties and 
religious ethno-nationalism, the association 
of Muslimness with criminality has led to an 
understanding of Muslim spaces as 
hazardous and unpleasant geographies 
which are breeding grounds for Islamist 
extremism, crime, and deprivation. 
 
Image 5: Posters put up by the armed right-
wing organization Hindu Sena (Hindu Army) on 
sign boards of important Islamic Institutions in 





The Enemy Within 
Neoliberal citizenship rooted in rights of private property ownership and participation within 
the financial circuits of urban capital has increasingly come to recognize access to capital (most 
importantly land) as the basis of claiming political and symbolic rights in our societies. The 
Muslim citizenry in India has been historically disenfranchised from gaining access to land, 
property, and credit beyond a certain limit (Sachar Committee Report 2006). In Delhi, 
properties of Muslims residing in the old city were confiscated by the British for their 
involvement in the revolt of 1858, thereby forcing the landless Muslims to migrate to other 
cities like Jaipur and Hyderabad (Gupta 1986 in Jamil 2017). To further propagate the ‘divide 
and rule’ policies, the British were instrumental in creating the binary — of the treacherous 
Muslim and the loyal Hindu— during this period. 
Pakistan, since its creation post-partition in 1947, has been vital for successive Indian 
governments in (re)producing and consolidating the Indian identity. Svensson (2009) in his work 
on India’s War in Terror remarks on the popular imagination of Pakistan as “an inverted 
grotesque twin of India” (p.39). Indo-Pak wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999 as well as army 
standoffs of 2001, 2008, 2013, and 2019 apart from dehumanizing the ‘enemy’ have been 
accompanied by an increase in punitive laws and surveillance on Indian Muslims. Immediately 
after the war with Pakistan in 1965 the Enemy Property Act (1968)20 went beyond a wartime 
measure to economically damage the Muslim community and mark them as enemy in the eyes 
of their Hindu neighbours (Umar 2019). In her scholarship on Constructing the “Citizen Enemy”, 
Umar (ibid.) also remarked that in the process of dehumanizing the enemy a new class of 
property-less “children or relatives of the enemy” emerged (p.460). The prolonged court cases 
of disputed ‘enemy properties’ and public scrutiny and validation of the Muslim citizen’s 
citizenship have subsequently normalized anti-minority tropes against them. 
 
 
20 Enemy Property Act was implemented with the objective of preventing a subject of an enemy State from 




“The message is that Muslims must not go beyond a certain class limit, and study in 
madarsas [religious schools], so that they can blame us for being anti-modern”. 
Interview of Raja Mahmoudabad in Umar 2019, p. 461) 
 
Since partition, Indian Muslims have consistently dealt with the stigma of “the enemy within” 
and had their spatial politics questioned as threats to internal security. Muslim concentrations 
—be it Jamia Nagar and North-Eastern regions of Delhi, Juhapura and old city in Ahmedabad, or 
Mumbra and Nagpada in Mumbai —have all experienced mass arrests and surveillance of 
Muslim men following communal unrests in their cities. Svensson (2009), Khan (2020) and 
Rajagopal (2010) have all reported the annulment of class identities during these arrests. 
Instead, the religious identity along with associations to Muslim neighborhoods and institutions 
become the primary basis of surveillance and disciplining by the state and police.   
The 2019 report of National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB 2019) showed that Muslims who 
constitute 14.2% of the Indian population are overrepresented in Indian prisons where they 
constitute 38.1% of all prison populations. Muslims make up 17.5% of all convicts, 19.6% of all 
undertrials, 58% of “other” prisoners (civil offenses), and 34% of detenues (ibid.). The 
percentage of Muslims under trial or arrested for “civil unrest” is only believed to have 
increased in Delhi since the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Delhi Minorities Commission in April 
issued a notice to the commissioner of Delhi Police stating that they have been “arresting 
young Muslim boys by their dozens every single day” from Muslim colonies in North-East Delhi 
(Khan 2020). The arrests made in relation to anti-Muslim pogrom in these neighbourhoods in 
February 2020 came to the forefront only after a video of Muslim women protesting on the 
streets of the Mustafabad neighborhood during the lockdown began to be circulated by news 
media. One report has estimated over 800 people (including prominent leaders and organizers 
during the anti-CAA protests) being arrested since February 2020 (Bhandari 2020). 
Most alarmingly, while countries around the world are depopulating their prisons during the 
pandemic, India is seeing an unprecedented increase in arrests and convictions during this 
period. The Supreme Court of India in an order in March 2020 demanded the release of 




hold upto 10,033 people, as of October 2020 have 17,871 prisoners (approx. 178.1% 
overcrowding), out of which about 90% are under trial (Bokil, Sonavane, and Srujana 2020).  
Criminalizing Space 
The primary fieldwork of this major paper contributes to the understanding of how the 
racialized Muslim space is produced through its exclusion. It does so by integrating spatial 
analysis with traditional archival materials and oral histories. I observe that the territorialized 
control of Muslims and the criminalization of their spatial politics has led to the solidification of 
a new racial order within Indian cities. This spatial analysis must be followed by a study of 
practices of slow violence and of the ways in which the tentacles of the criminal justice system 
and prison industrial complex have converged on the lives of territorialized urban Muslims in 
India. 
One of the ways in which the Hindu nationalist project has maintained the ‘othering’ of the 
Indian Muslim is through the selective and sensational nature of crime reportage in Muslim 
neighborhoods. The typical response to crime inside Muslim colonies when it is targeted at 
Muslim residents themselves, is often neglect, contempt, and stigmatization, instead of relief 
and support from state functionaries. As a consequence of religious segregation and economic 
exploitation, Muslim women and children are at an extreme risk of violence and suffer the most 
in a criminal justice system which is only alarmed by crimes against non-Muslims. Crimes 
committed by Muslim people against non-Muslims are considered a greater threat than those 
committed against Muslim women, children, and elderly, if highlighted at all (see Kamat and 
Mathew 2003, Sarkar 1999 and Katju 2011). While not elaborated in this paper, Delhi’s health 
care system and its inaccessibility to various classes of Muslims is another example of violence 
of segregation and differentiated experience of Muslims in the city. A horrifying example came 
to light during the six-day anti-Muslim pogrom in February 2020, when many journalists 
reported that Muslim victims were denied health care in nearby hospitals: 
“People injured during the North- East Delhi communal riots were given dismal 
level of healthcare, denied of healthcare, discharged without proper treatment and 




“Ugravadi” (militant) and “Atankvadi “(terrorist) by the medical staff of the Delhi 
government run Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital (GTBH).” (Masoud 2020) 
State planning and policies of enumeration have also been used by the right-wing in India to 
particularly targeted Muslim houses during state enabled anti-Muslim pogroms. Earlier 
observed during the 2002 Gujrat riots, the Delhi 2020 anti-Muslim pogrom also showed a great 
deal of pre-planning with saffron flags being used to demarcate Hindu homes from Muslim 
households in North-East Delhi. Muslim homes and neighbourhoods, which are marked as 
criminal, are then further isolated from the material as well symbolic support required to 
protect and recover from political violence. 
 
Image 6: Saffron Flags separating Hindu households from Muslim ‘enemy properties’ were 
noticed on 24th February in North-East Delhi, where the anti-Muslim pogrom  
lasted for six days between 23-29th February 2020. Source: @vinodjose via twitter 
As traced by Agamben (2005), the desires of those who live in these “states of exception” are 
most often to be included in the political community as an equal. The internal boundaries 
amongst Muslims which preserve their class and caste distinction, then, become means of 
securing greater citizenship and participation. This participation however is on the terms of the 




form of state documentation might translate into greater security for some, not all groups will 
be able to provide such proof.  
The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), National Register of Citizens (NRC) and National 
Population Register (NPR), if/when implemented, may potentially create one of the largest 
crises of statelessness in the world, particularly targeted at Muslims, but also affecting low 
income people, trans people, women, and internally displaced people (Sathyanarayanan 2020, 
Shankar 2020). During such a time the identity formations within minority groups in response 
to state oppression and exclusion from the larger citizenry must be recognized and supported 
ideologically and materially. 
Varun Grover21’s poem Ham Kaghaz Nahin Dikhayenge (We will not show you our documents) 
quickly gained traction and became a rallying cry at anti-CAA protests in India and across the 
world. If/when the time comes to withhold citizenship documents from the government, it is 
not possible to determine how many of the citizens (especially those with complete proof) will 
translate this call to action. However, the public nature of this open dissent and the threat of 
defying government orders at this scale, is enough to challenge the rationality of the sovereign 
state and to destabilize its power relations with the masses (Flyvbjerg 2003, Proposition 5).  
Muslim neighborhoods in Jamia Nagar and North-East Delhi are becoming sites of Muslim 
liberation and radical politics. The Shaheen Bagh 24X7 occupation by Muslim women of Jamia 
Nagar, blocked the National Highway artery in Kalindi Kunj area of New Delhi for over 100 days, 
until being prematurely dispersed on 24th March 2020 due to the pandemic. During this time, 
291 protest sites modeling the Shaheen Bagh protest emerged across various cities and towns 
in India with the popular sentiment of “Har Shehr Shaheen Bagh” (every city is Shaheen 
Bagh)22. This extremely powerful method of occupation and civil disobedience is exceptional in 
its recognition of Muslim women —who are otherwise projected to be docile members of the 
political society— as leaders of a nation-wide movement. However, most importantly, it is a 
 
21 Varun Grover is a political stand up comedian known for his commentary on issues of democracy and citizenship. 
22 See photos of different ‘Shaheen Baghs’ in various cities in India at In Photos: Civil disobedience is everywhere! 




reproduction of the spatial politics of Muslim women and youth, which recognizes the power of 









Image 8 and 9: Occupation of Maulana Muhammad Ali Road, by Jamia Millia Islamia students.  
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